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Academiceconomists find, periodically, that the most pressing question
they wish to answer is different from what it was just a little earlier. Each
change in fashion inevitably results in a call to broaden or alter the
National Income Accounts. Currently the U.S. Accounts primarily reflect
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thequestion: "Will aggregate demand be sufficient to fully employ
labor?" Recently, Christensen and Jorgenson, as well as Nancy and
Richard Ruggles, and John Kendrick have tried to shift the emphasis to
aggregate supply in response to the question: "How can the long-term
growth rate be raised?" In the Christensen and Jorgenson variant,
appropriately accounting for the functional distribution of income
emerges as a key complementary issue. More recently the question has
been: "What can be done to raise social welfare?" with a key complemen-
tary issue being appropriately accounting for the size distribution of
personal income. The most recent question heightens, even more than
the growth question, the ever present tension between national income as
an index of wealth versus national income as an index of welfare
(Nordhaus and Tobin).
This paper is in the latest fashion. It is concerned with one important
issue in appropriately accounting for the size distribution of income—the
treatment of in-kind transfers. Hesitantly, and with great diffidence, it
puts welfare before wealth, and the size distribution before the functional
distribution. Opening the accounts to welfare concepts is full of familiar
complications. For example, measuring the benefits of in-kind transfers
appears to require recourse to a utility function.
The paper is in two main parts. First, we offer a rationale and an
illustrative set of T accounts with which to account for in-kind transfers.
In the accounts, benefits are attributed both to direct recipients and to
taxpayers. Second, we offer an illustrative set of numbers to show that
appropriately accounting for in-kind transfers alters our view of the size
distribution of income and affects aggregate measures of inequality.
In-kind transfers in this paper refer only to those quantitatively large
government programs which subsidize quite specific goods or services to
potentially identifiable people.' Even this thoroughly expedient defini-
tion of in-kind transfers poses thorny theoretical issues. One fundamental
question is: "Should the benefits of in-kind transfers to recipients be
valued at their cost to taxpayers?" A simulation experiment suggests a
surprising response. We then draw some conclusions on the desirability of
expanding the number of subsidiary tables of the Personal Income and
Outlay Account, in order to provide a more satisfactory picture of in-kind
transfers.
I.ACCOUNTING FOR IN-KIND TRANSFERS
Weshall be concerned primarily with the Personal Income and Outlay
Account. Personal income is household rncome, where households are
10 Smolerisky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnickdefined to include nonincorporated business, nonexistent businesses (to
take account of imputed rental income), nonprofit institutions, and
private trust and pension funds, so that charity flows can be conveniently
netted out of the Commerce Department work load unless they pass
through corporations or the government. Current procedures include
cash transfers and the food stamp subsidy in personal income, but most of
what we will call in-kind transfers appear only as purchases in Table 3.10
(Gover.nment Expenditures by Type of Function).
We shall consider here three modifications in the current procedure.
The first is by now no longer controversial and we mention it merely in
passing. We accept the suggestion of Nancy and Richard Ruggles and
Kendrick that government capital formation and capital consumption be
included in the accounts as separate items. This is important for us,
because it would raise the dollar value of in-kind transfers. Indeed, for
programs like public housing, in which the transfer consists largely of not
charging tenants for the cost of capital consumption, nothing else makes
sense.
Our second suggestionisto include in-kind transfers to direct
beneficiaries in Personal Income and to value them at the minimum cash
payment the recipients would accept to forgo those in-kind transfers.
(Call this "recipient benefits.") The final modification we propose is to
recognize that in-kind transfers benefit the givers and to assign that
benefit to taxpayers. (Call this "taxpayer benefits.") These modifications
are proposed both to get the totals correct and to redress a bias in the
related size distribution.
The modifications of the accounts proposed in this paper (beyond the
inclusion of government capital consumption allowances) apply only to
the Personal Income Accounts. The Income and Product and the
Government Accounts are left unchanged to permit the continued
provision of data for aggregate employment demand models.
Rationalefor the Suggested Modifications
Enlargingthe concept of income to include in-kind transfers is a short
extension of existing practice. The most basic plausible definitions of
income and output—the value of money income received by factor
owners and the dollar value of market output—have proven unsuitable
even for narrow purposes. Accordingly, we already add selectively from
nonmarketed private production. We also add money transfer payments
which gives us both a better measure of aggregate demand and a measure
closer to welfare. We go even further and add transfers of vouchers for
goods, in particular, food stamps. Having added cash and vouchers, why
In-KindTransfers to the Personal Income and Outlay Account
Iiinotadd commodities? Business in-kind transfers are probably too small
to be worth the effort.2 Government may pose the opposite problem,
since, at the limit, all expenditures as well as taxes may be transfers. Still, a
substantial proportion of in-kind transfers of goods and services goes to
specific recipients. It certainly seems desirable to extend the concept of
personal income to encompass these changes for the same reasons that
cash transfers are accounted for.
Our proposed modifications, which would account for in-kind transfers
at their cash equivalent values and would account for taxpayer benefits
are, however, not simple extensions of current practice. If adopted, they
will establish an unwelcome precedent for evaluating private goods at
their cash equivalent value, ex post. Yet, if we are to have a meaningful
measure of the size distribution for issues of vertical equity, or if we are to
bring philanthropy, public and private, into positive economics, or even if
we are to obtain sensible Engel curves for the lower end of the income
distribution, we cannot logically proceed in any other way.
ConceptualIssues
Ourprocedure requires that we measure the cash value of in-kind
transfers to recipients. A simple extension of current practice would
equate recipient benefits to taxpayer costs. However, most economists
expect recipient benefits to be less than taxpayer costs.3 To the extent that
this expectation is realized, following current practice would bias the
distribution. Thus, we propose to measure the recipient's valuation of
in-kind programs as the minimum cash transferY) which would be
necessary to get the recipient to the utility level achieved after receipt of
the in-kind transfers.
The size ofYdepends upon the functional form and parameters of the
recipient's utility function as well as on the number of in-kind programs
available to the recipient, the extent of the subsidies, and any possible
consumption restrictions associated with the relevant public program. A
utility function must be chosen to calculateY, and hence an arbitrary
element is introduced.
An additional major problem associated with using theYvaluation of
recipient benefits is that it is not consistent with the valuation of other
goods in the accounts. Current practice values intramarginal units at their
marginal benefits, unless the good is of an all-or-nothing kind, whereas
Vincludes any consumer surplus.
Turning to taxpayer benefits, current practice regards expenditure on
transfers as a burden on taxpayers rather than as a purchase which
12 Smolensky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnickincreases their welfare. Because the tax system, as conventionally
measured, is mildly progressive, treating taxes in this manner biases the
size distribution of disposable income toward equality. Our proposal
attempts to redress this presumed bias.
Theoretical support for considering taxpayer benefits is based on the
currentliteratureon"ParetoEfficientRedistribution,"which
rationalizes cash and in-kind transfers by postulating that taxpayer and
recipient utility functions are interdependent. Indeed, the literature
assumes that the donors rationally maximize their own welfare by making
transfers, cash and in kind, until the marginal cost of a transfer payment
equals the marginal benefit of the payment (Hochman and Rodgers; von
Furstenberg and Mueller). If we accept the assumption of rational
maximizing behavior on the part of donors, the accounting framework
must assume that transfers make neither the taxpayer nor the recipient
worse off. It follows not only that taxpayer benefits must be measured, but
also that total benefits to taxpayers must be at least equal to total cost.4
Once we admit the existence of benefits to taxpayers, their value must
be calculated. We shall make the strong lower-bound assumption that for
each in-kind program total benefits to taxpayers equal the total cost to
taxpayers. That is, we assume total (as opposed to marginal) benefit
taxation. This assumption implies that if recipients benefit at all, the total
benefits of the program to recipients and to taxpayers exceed the total
costs in the aggregate (but not necessarily at the margin).
TheModified Personal Income and Outlay Accounts
Theproposed treatment of in-kind transfer programs in the Personal
Income and Outlay Account is presented in this section using Medicaid
and public housing as examples. The accounting procedure for cash
transfers is presented first to establish a norm for comparison. The cash
transfer entries entail only one modification, on the outlay side of the
account. The in-kind transfers entries will modify both the outlay and the
income sides of the accounts.5
Cash Transfers
Assume that the government provides 30 cash transfers in a given year,
earned income is 100, the only government activity is the transfer
program, and all disposable income is consumed. The Personal Income
and Outlay Account would presently appear as follows:




expenditures 100 Earned income 100
Government transfers
Personal tax payments 30 to persons 30
These entries correctly value the cash transfer to the recipient, but
ignore the value of the payment to the taxpayers.6 To represent taxpayer
benefits, we propose the following entries modifying what now appears




expenditures 100 Earned income 100
Government transfers




due tø government pur-
chase of redistribution —30
On the outlay side, we treat the 30 just like any consumption purchase
in the private market but the government is the intermediator, funneling
the tax outlay into consumption of redistribution for the taxpayer.7 To
indicate the taxpayers' consumption benefits, we enter 30 under con-
sumption outlays and correspondingly reduce the tax outlay. Having
started from the published accounts rather than de novo, taxes must be
to offset the 30 added to consumption outlays.8 The new entry
also emphasizes the underlying conceptual change. Instead of a burden,
the transfer is identified as a welfare-increasing purchase.
Our modification suggests that two different size distributions be
calculated. The income side would be distributed by income class
14 Smolensky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnickaccording to "Earned Income" and "Government Transfers to Persons"
in the usual way. The outlay side would normally have the same
distribution. In our accounts the outlay side is distributed according to the
two categories "Personal Consumption Expenditures" and "Personal
Consumption of Redistribution." To the extent that "Personal Con-
sumption of Redistribution" is distributed differently than "Personal Tax
Payments" the distribution of our Outlays will differ from the distribution
of Income. The two distributions would provide an upper and lower
measure of income inequality. Since we expect that taxpayer benefits are
more unequally distributed than taxes, the outlay side will be more
unequally distributed.
In-Kind Transfers Directly Financed
In this section we describe the procedures to be used for all directly
financed in-kind transfers. To simplify the exposition, assume earned
income is 100, all disposable income is consumed, and the only govern-
ment activities are an expenditure of 10 for a pure public good and a
transfer program that provides at no charge 30 units of medical services.
SupposeYis the cash equivalent value placed on this in-kind transfer by
recipients.
Current accounting for the Personal Income and Outlay Account in




expenditures 60 Earned income 100
Personal tax payments 40
The consumption of 30 units of subsidized medical care does not appear
in these accounts, but would be found in the government accounts as a
government purchase.
Our proposal would recognize explicitly that this form of medical care
is an in-kind type of income and consumption. The recipient cash
equivalent, would be added to personal income as "Recipient
Benefits from In-Kind Transfers" and to personal outlays as "Personal
(In-Kind) Consumption Expenditures." As with cash transfers, we would
further consider the 30 Personal Tax Payments which financed the
In-KindTransfers tothe Personal Incomeand Outlay Account
I15transfer to be a consumption purchase of redistribution services. Hence,




expenditures 60 + Y Earned income 100
Recipient benefits
from in-kind
Personal tax payments 10 transfers Y
Consumption of
redistribution 30
The proposed accounting procedure requires slight modification for
food stamps, which presently are included in personal income and outlay
but at the cost to taxpayer and with no attribution of donor benefits.9 On
the income side, food stamps appear in "Government Transfers to
Persons." It is therefore necessary to reduce this entry by the taxpayer
cost and add in our new account, "Recipient Benefits.. .," theircash-
equivalent value.
On the outlay side, consumption must be adjusted to allow for the fact,
made so explicit on the income side, that recipients may not value their
increased food consumption at market prices. Furthermore, "Personal
Tax Payments" should be lowered and "Consumption of Redistribution"
increased by an equal amount.
In-Kind Transfers Indirectly Financed
The treatment of public housing in the accounts must differ from the
preceding because the subsidy is not financed directly from tax outlays.
The subsidy arises because rental income is not sufficient to amortize
capital costs. The taxpayer cost is an opportunity cost rather than a direct
tax outlay. The accounts as presently constructed ignore entirely the
subsidized recipient benefit and the taxpayer cost, because government
capital consumption is not included
Our proposed modifications require the prior assumption that the
accounts have been changed to include government capital consumption
and then entail further changes. We include the Income and Product and
the Government Accounts to clarify the capital consumption problems.
16 Smolensky, Stiefel,Schmundt, and PlotnickIt will facilitate the exposition of the accounting framework to use some
numbers. Assume:
The gross rent (assumed equal to resource cost) which a public housing
unit would obtain in the private market 74
Maintenance costs of a public housing unit 42
Rental value of public housing capital (depreciation +interest) 32
Rent charged tenants 44
Market value of subsidy to tenant 30
The following is presumed to be the current accounting practice for the












Personal tax and nontax
Purchases 42 payments 44
Current surplus, etc. 2 Nontax payments 44
Tax payments 0
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A specific method for entering government capital consumption into
the accounts has been proposed (Nancy and Richard Ruggles). This
method increases total outlays and income in the Product and Govern-












Notice that GNP is increased by 30. On the income side of the account an
addition of 30 in capital consumption is included; on the product side a
new item appears, imputed services of durables, which probably ought to
go into the government account.
The Government Receipts and Expenditures Account would then look
as follows:















Again the accounts are increased by 30 of imputed income on the income
side and imputed services on the outlay side.










Our proposals would go on to assign the benefits of public housing to
taxpayers on the one hand and to tenants on the other. The final table
therefore is:







expenditures 44 Earned income 42
Imputed services of









The accounts for public housing differ from that of cash and voucher
transfers because the subsidy is not financed directly out of taxes.'° On
the income side, an implicit cash flow from capital consumption has been
added. It is this income which is transferred to tenants, and their valuation
of this benefit, must also be recorded. On the outlay side, no
adjustment is made to taxes paid. The imputed services of durables are
consumption expenditures assigned to tenants. The implicit transfer of 30
is entered as "Personal Consumption of Redistribution."
All other indirectly financed in-kind transfers can be treated in this
way.
Summary andConclusionson the Accounting Framework
Several principles emerge from the proposed treatment of in-kind
transfers which should prove applicable when further modifications of the
accounts are considered.
1.Capital consumption allowances are an important element of the
redistribution process and must be carefully accounted for.
2.The double-entry nature of the accounts serves as more than a
check on consistency when transfers are assumed to be Pareto
efficient. The size distributions based upon the two sides provide a
lower and upper bound to the degree of inequality in the distribu-
tion of income.
20
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Upto this point, the paper has stressed that in-kind transfers should be
included in Personal Income, and a procedure for doing this was
specified. The remainder of this paper implements the accounting system
and discusses three implications for the size distribution. We wish to show
first that accounting for in-kind transfers reduces income inequality
compared to the distribution of cash income. Second, since recipient
benefits may be less than the cost to the government, this difference is
measured and its implications discussed. Finally, a technique for measur-
ing donor benefits from in-kind transfers is implemented and the results
evaluated.
At the outset, we simplify matters by setting benefits equal to costs to
taxpayers. This assumption is then relaxed.
Definingand Accounting for In-Kind Transfers
Areasonable definition of an in-kind transfer would be the difference
between what the taxpayer would pay for a good or service in a Lindahl
equilibrium and what he does pay (Behrens and Smolensky). Every
program would probably then involve some transfer. In this paper, only
goods and services provided to clearly identifiable beneficiaries at other
than marginal cost are called transfers. Even this approach implies a
relatively broad view of what constitutes in-kind transfers. The programs
that ordinarily are classed as in-kind transfers are included—food stamps,
Medicaid and Medicare, public housing, and so forth. Such programs
provide what we label as consumption in-kind benefits. Our definition
also includes investment in-kind transfers. This category is comprised of
direct expenditures on public education, subsidies, and grants to students
(e.g., 01 Bill and manpower programs); in short, subsidized programs
which principally increase the recipient's human capital. The distinction
between consumption and investment transfers is not always clear-cut;
health programs could be either, for example. Since we treat both types in
identical ways in our analysis, the distinction is merely an expositional
convenience.















Food stampsa 1,577 1,577
Commodity distnbutiona 321 321
Child nutritionb 703 185 888
Public housing' 368 368
Rent supplementsb 18 18
Medicare4 5,255 5,255
Medicaid° 2,548 2,260 4,808
Veterans hospital and
medical careb 1,651 1,651
OEO health and nutritionb 123 123
Legal aid 51 51'
Subtotal 12,615 2,445 15,060
Investment transfers
Elementary, secondary
and other education' 1,214 42,934 44,148
Higher education' 336 11,325 11,661
Manpower programs 1,149 98 1,247
MDTA institutional8 173 173
MDTA 36 36
NYC in-school8 41 41
NYC out-of -school8 21 21
Operation Mainstream 9 9
Concentrated employment8 82 82
JOBS8 82 82
Job Corps8 96 96
WIN8 50 50
Vocational rehabilitation' 340 98 438
Other manpower8 219 219
Veterans education 991 991
Total in-kind transfer
expenditures 16,305 56,802 73,107
Skolnik and S. Dales, "Social Welfare Expenditures," unpublished tables of the Office of Research, Social
Security Administration. Total includes administrative costs and is for FY 1971.
blbidexcludes administrative costs, and is for FY 1970.
cEstimated value of subsidy derived from Table 3.
"Data from SocialSecurity BulletinAnnual Statistical Supplement, 1970, Table 117. row 2; net of SMI premium
cost to recipients and adjusted slightly downward since the Current Population Survey (used to derive Table 3)
counts less eligibles than did the Social Security Administration. Data is for calendar year 1970. (Excludes
adminittrative costs.)
22 ISmolensky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnick
INotes to Table 1 (concluded)
"Totalexpendituredata is for calendar year 1970 and is from Number of Recipients and Amounts of Payments
Under Medicaid. 1970, [-fEW, Social and Rehabilitation Services publication number (SRS) 73-03153.
Allocation between federal and state-local governments is based on the average of the proportion of Medicaid
expenditures found in Skolnik-Dales, for FY 1970 and 1971. (Excludes administrative costs.)
tReynolds-Smolensky. Appendix D, for FY 1970.
2Data is for FY 1970 and is from U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Special Analyses, Budget of the United States,
1972 (Washington, D.C., 1971), P. 138. (Excludes administrative costs. Expenditures adjusted to exclude
estimated cash payments to participants.)
5Data is for FY 1970 but on obligations basis—U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Report of the President,
1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 299. (Excludes administrative costs. Expenditures adjusted to exclude
estimated payments to participants.)
'Skolnik and Dales, "Social Welfare Expenditures," (Excludes administrative costs. Expenditures adjusted to
exclude estimated cash payments to participants.)
of Veterans AfTairs, 1972 Annual Report, p. 166.
In 1970 the federal government provided $16 billion in in-kind
transfer benefits. State and local governments administered another $57
billion, mainly for education. The major in-kind programs (as we define
them) and their costs are listed in Table 1. The dollar volume of in-kind
transfers exceeded that of cash transfers, which totaled $63 billion in
1970.11
In what follows we restrict our attention to seven major in-kind
transfer programs ($68.8 billion in 1970).12 Implementing the proposed
accounting system to record these expenditures produces the following
accounts:



















"Current Population Survey money income, as reported in Projector and Bretz, Table 5.
bpersonal contributions for social insurance are not deducted on the income side and, consequently, are included
on the outlay side.
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The Distribution of In-Kind Income
Wefocus here on the right-hand side of Table 2 and ask how the provision
of $68.8 billion of in-kind transfers affected average household incomes
and the degree of income inequality. Table 3 shows that in-kind transfers
markedly increase the average incomes of all groups (col. 12). For the
poorest group, the difference of $559 (cól. 10) increases income by 215
percent.
There is a strong positive relationship between benefits and income.
Regression indicates that a rise in cash income of 1 percent is, on the
average, associated with a .22 percent gain in in-kind transfer income. An
exception in this pattern for the range $6,000—$7,999 results largely from
decreased Medicaid benefits after $6,000.
Consumption transfers, nevertheless, are distributed in a strongly
propoor pattern (col. 5). Investment transfers, which account for 79
percent of all in-kind transfers, rise steadily with income (col. 9).
Although in-kind transfers are prorich, they are more evenly distri-
buted than cash incomes. Hence, including them in personal income
decreases the degree of "inequality." The Gini coefficient for cash
income was .398; adding all in-kind benefits shifts it down to .371.
Similarly, including in-kind transfers raises the share of income going to
the four poorest income classes—the bottom 24 percent—from 5.2
percentto 6.5 percent. A third measure of inequality, the coefficient of
variation, declines from .52 to .49 when income includes in-kind trans-
fers.
The high level of aggregation and our use of averages obscures the fact
that in any given income bracket, some households receive above-
average benefits by participating in many in-kind programs, while others
with nearly equal cash incomes obtain few or no benefits (Joint Economic
Committee). Though the degree of equity of some individual in-kind
transfer programs has been studied (Smolensky and Gomery, Feldstein),
currently available data do not permit a study of this issue for the complete
system of in-kind transfers. National data on program enrollment and
benefits at the family level are needed but are nonexistent.
The data in Table 3 are meant to be illustrative of orders of magnitude
only. No attempt has been made to adjust for known sources of bias (e.g.,
underreporting of money income in the CPS), or for inconsistencies in S
reporting periods (some data are for the calendar, some for the fiscal,
year), and so forth. Often, distributing benefits by income class required
heroic assumptions.
One slightly less obvious caveat to note about Table 3 is that it does not
measure, even conceptually, the redistribution of income due to in-kind
transfers. Measuring the redistribution of income due to the fisc, or any
24 Smolensky,Stiefel,Schmundt, and Plotnickpart of it, requires a quite different accounting framework. The essential
element of this framework is a counterfactual which recognizes the
general equilibrium interdependence between the fisc and the distribu-
tion of earned income. What is important in Table 3 is that the sum of
columns 10 and 11 represents a more complete distribution of personal
income.
Finally, it should be noted that human capital investments are valued at
their supply price. Two comments are in order on this procedure. Though
the supply price may differ from the capitalized value of the associated
future earnings stream, any such difference does not affect current
income. Second, the cash equivalent of the subsidy need not equal the
supply price, since human capital investments are in-kind transfers.
ASimulation Approach to Benefit Weights
Ithas been demonstrated that in-kind benefits when valued at taxpayer
cost affect measured income inequality. In this section we determine if
this conclusion would be altered by valuing in-kind transfers at their cash
equivalence to recipients. Our procedure is to calculate a set of scalars
(benefit weights) which convert taxpayers' costs to benefits as evaluated
by the recipient. A range of benefit weights for a selected list of programs
is obtained via simulation.
Five programs were selected for this simulation—food stamps, public
housing, rent supplements, Medicare, and Medicaid. We assume each
recipient family participates in a package of in-kind transfer programs,
and is enrolled in at most one housing and one medical program. A utility
function, a budget constraint (Y) and maximizing behavior are assumed
and the utility the family obtains is calculated. The cash income that the
family would need if it were to enjoy the same level of utility but received
no in-kind transfers, EY, is then computed. It is inferred that the bundle
of in-kind benefits increased the family's welfare, measured in dollar
terms, by EY—Y. The ratio of EY—Yto the taxpayer cost of providing this
set of transfers is the benefit weight.
Specifying the Utility Function
A variant of the displaced Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
utility function was used in this exercise.13 Because the five in-kind
programs we are concerned with involve only three commodities—food,
housing, and medical insurance—the utility function has just four argu-
ments, these three and "other." Hence, we assume

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































g, =displacementparameter (minimum quantity consumed);
Li, c =parameters;and
=elasticityof substitution.
To proceed with the simulation, equations 1 and 2 must be given
empirical content, which in turn requires identifying the c•, g1, b1,andcr. To
show that the c1's are the marginal propensities to consume, assume that
good 4 is "other," g4 =0,and quantity units are specified so that market
prices equal unity. Maximizing eqjlation 2 with the constraint Y =x1
gives
(3) j=1,2,3
Theparameter values of the c1 were chosen for the utility functions of
five prototype families, which differ by size and/or income, from the
expenditure data in the Survey of Consumer Expenditures, 1960_61.15
The data themselves are observations of the money spent on x1,.. ,x4
by family size and income, and from them we computed crude estimates
of c1,...,c4.
To determine the minimum consumption expenditures on each good
(g,) we solve the demand equations of (3) and obtain
(4) j=1,2,3
To identify the Li1, maximize (1), and solve the demand equations for g1
to obtain
(4')
Comparing (4') to (4) shows that
/C.'
b'' I —
Onlycr remains to be identified. The simulations were run by successively




Maximizing Utility with the Transfer Programs
Substituting our choice of o and our parameters into (1) and (2) produces
a specific utility function for each prototype family. Assigning a particular
package of in-kind benefits to a family, we maximize its utility using this
estimated function, subject to the budget constraint (5) which exists when
in-kind transfers are received
(5)
I II II IR
We are assuming units are chosen such that all prices are unity and
Y=family cash income;
s =subsidyrate for good / which depends on the transfer program's
features and may depend on Y;
xp1= totalamount of good j consumed when family receives the assigned
set of in-kind transfers;
xr1 =quantityof good j required to be consumed if received as an in-kind
transfer. This number is constant for each recipient and is deter-
mined by the government.
I, II, III =programcategories which are defined next.
As indicated in equation 5, each commodity falls into one of three
categories depending upon the way in which the rules of the program
affect the budget constraint.
Goods in category I are one of three types:
a.nonsubsidized (s, =0)because the family does not participate in an
in-kind program providing good j;
b."other" goods, where no subsidy is ever available, or
c.subsidized at rate s, both on the margin and inframarginally. That
is, there is no quantity restriction on the consumption of this
transfer (e.g., Medicare), or some maximum limit has been set by
the administrators which is larger than the amount actually desired
at the subsidized price.
Category II contains commodities for which the subsidy ceases at
quantity xr,andthe recipient must purchase at least xr,, but is free to
supplement this level of consumption at market prices without losing the
subsidy and does so. In this case the family pays (1 —s1) xr, for the
subsidized goods, and xp1 —xr, for the unsubsidized portion. The total
cost is xp, —s1xr,as shown in (5). Note that s1xr, is de facto an outright cash
transfer since the subsidy does not affect the family's market behavior at
the margin.16
Subsidized items in category III are those for which the recipient either
must consume a prescribed fixed quantity xr1 or desires to consume this
In-KindTransfers to the Personal Income and Outlay Account
I29amount. Public housing, which restricts a recipient to one particular
apartment, falls in this category.
Figure 1 relates the three categories to the budget constraint for a
subsidized commodity. If the good is in category I, there is no relevant
restraint imposed by regulation on the quantity the household can
consume and the budget constraint is therefore AD. If the commodity is
in category II, it is subsidized up to some quantity, xr,, and the household
must consume at least that quantity but consumes additional units
purchased at the market price. Hence the household is restricted to the
segment BC. In category III, the quantity the household must consume
and the price it must pay are both fixed; the budget constraint collapses to
point B.
Now that the budget constraint (5) has been explained, we proceed to
indicate the demand functions for each category of goods obtained from
maximizing utility.
-1
(6) Category I xp, =g1+c,(1 c(1 ci]A
(7) Category II xp1 =g1+c,c,(1 + A
FIGURE1Budget Constraints for Subsidized
Commodities
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To obtain the simulated numerical values for the xp1 from equations 6, 7,
and 8, we need estimates of c1, g1, s, xr,,Y,and a-. The first two are known
from the utility function, while we chose various representative values of
Y and o-. We approximated theandxr, that a prototype family would
face if it participated in program jbyexamining the specific regulations of
each of the five in-kind programs and making several assumptions.
17
Thenumerical values for the xp1 are substituted into (1) and (2) to
compute the family's utility U", given that it receives a particular set of
in-kind transfers.
At this point we observe from (6) through (8) that the amount of food,
shelter, and medical care (i.e., the xp1) demanded can vary as the category
in which the corresponding in-kind transfer is placed varies. In turn, this
means that U", a function of the xp,, is not unique. The problem is
partially mitigated because one can unambiguously assign Medicare and
Medicaid to category I, and public housing to III. However, food stamps
may fall in either category II or category III, since the program permits a
family's XPI0Odtoexceed XTI0Od(II)or to be equal to it (III). The actual
outcome depends upon the family's demand functions for all four com-
modities simultaneously. (Rent supplements, similarly, can be in any
category.)
To deal with this simultaneity problem, all permutations of categories
were considered when the transfer package at hand included food stamps
and/or rent supplements. Inconsistent results were eliminated; of the
remainder, the one yielding the highest utility was selected for further
analysis.
18
Havingdetermined the recipient family's utility U*, given its cash
income and its participation in a set of in-kind transfer programs, we next
compute how much money income, EY, it would need to maintain the
same U" if no in-kind transfers were available. We maximize (1) or (2)
subject to the usual constraint that is in force when no in-kind transfers
exist
(9)
This gives the quantities demanded as a function of EY
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Substituting the right-hand side into (1) or (2) produces the indirect utility
function U(EY). Solving
(11)U(EY)=U*
gives EY*thecash equivalent of cash income, Y, plus in-kind transfers.
Hence the transfers provide a dollar benefit of EY*— Y.
The taxpayer cost is
(12) (s,+p1—1)xr7
I 11.111
wheremarket prices =1and=ratioof government cost price to market
price. (Note that when 1, TC is simply the direct subsidy at market
prices given to recipients.)
The benefit weight is
(13)Er-Y
TC













f 1.0 1.0 na na 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 na na
p 0.61078na na0.620.800.860.93na na
r na na na na na na0.991.00.990.99
mr 0.810.890.910.95na na na na na na
md 0.640.76na na0.670.780.740.85na na
1, p 0.720.85na na0.900.950.940.97na na
f, r na na na na na na0.980.99na na
F, mr 0.880.93na na na na na na na na
f, md0.720.81na na0.860.910.830.90na na
p, md0.740.85na na0.750.860.870.93na na
r, md na na na na na na0.840.91 na na
1, p. md 0.800.87na na0.910.950.920.95na na
F, r, mdna na na na na na0.860.92na na
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LA sample of the benefit weights obtained appears in Table 4. Of the five
prototype families, two were two-person households and can be thought
of as elderly couples. One had a low income of $2,869 and was eligible for
several transfers; the other's income of $4,883 entitled it only to
Medicare. We assumed that these families would not receive rent
subsidies. The three remaining families had four members and incomes of
$3,414, $4,706, and
Several notable observations emerge from the table. Turning first to
those instances in which households participate in only one program, one
conclusion easily drawn is that the food stamp program is a de facto cash
transfer. All families attach a weight of one to their benefits, because most
families spend more on food than their stamp allotment even if they
receive no stamps. Rent supplements can also be considered cash
transfers in view of the benefit weights of .99 and 1. Public housing, in
contrast, benefits the recipients less than the government's cost of
providing it. For low income households, the benefit weights in the range
.6 to .8 indicate that the gain from renting public housing at, say, $500
below market prices (i.e., an in-kind transfer costing $500) is between
$300 and $400.20 For the middle-income family, government housing
subsidies are converted into direct consumption benefits at more efficient
rates (on. the order of .9). Compared to food stamps and rent supple-
ments, the lower benefit weights for public housing presumably reflect its
category III nature. Recipients must purchase the services of the
assigned apartment, no more, no less, and this rigid requirement may
create a large distortion in consumption patterns. The two medical
transfers also have a wide range of benefit weights. Even though
Medicaid is free, its weights are not one.
Many families that receive one of the five in-kind transfers also receive
others. Because of this, the benefit weights for selected groups of in-kind
transfers are also presented in Table 4. The weight for a two- or
three-program bundle is not an easily computed weighted average of the
several separate weights, but can only be derived independently. For
example, the benefit weight of a low-income two-person family receiving
both public housing and Medicaid is greater than the weight of either
program taken singly. These outcomes arise because the addition of a
new transfer changes the relative prices of all commodities and thereby
affects the total pattern of consumption. The general tenor of these
multi-transfer benefit weights is that they are on the high side. Few dip
below .8 and a number are close to one.
To determine if our earlier conclusions on the impact of in-kind
benefits on the size distribution could be affected by moving to a
cash-equivalent basis, we modified the entries in Table 3 based on the
results of Table 4. That set of benefit weights which would yield the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5maximum change in Table 3's figures was chosen for this exercise.21
Nonetheless, Table 5indicatesrelatively little change when compared
with Table 3, except for the three lowest income classes. A more prorich
pattern than that of Table 3 (as reproduced here in column 8) results
because benefit weights generally rise with income, but the change is
slight. The income elasticity of unweighted transfers is .22; after the
cash-equivalent adjustment, it is .27. For the unweighted distribution
based on taxpayer cost the Gini coefficient was .371; on a cash-equivalent
basis it rises to .374.
Ourbenefitweights apply only to consumption transfers. Conse-
quently, they have greater impact when attention is restricted to this type
of transfer, as is seen when columns 5 and 6 are compared. Again, of
course, benefit weight calculations modestly increase the progressivity of
in-kind transfers. Unweighted consumption transfers have income elas-
ticity of —.46; applying the weights increases this number to —.33.
Table 6 displays the proposed Income and Outlay Account when
in-kind transfers are incorporated at our minimum cash equivalent values
Y). Comparedto the earlier accounts of Table 2,Yis$2,041 million
(3 percent) less than the taxpayer cost. For food stamps, public housing,
Medicare, and Medicaid, the only programs for which we have calculated
benefit weights, the cash equivalent is 83 percent of taxpayer cost.22


















We have not calculated the cash-equivalent transfers for education.
That the benefit weights appropriate to education may differ from 1 (at
least for some income classes) is plausible enough to merit testing.
Conceptually the framework developed for consumption goods is applic-
able, but the required assumptions are strained even more, and the data
In-Kind Transfers to the Personal Income and Outlay Account 35requirements are more burdensome. For example, since private educa-
tion is consumed even when public education is available, public and
private education must be quite different goods. Appeal to budget data,
therefore, will not yield a marginal propensity to consume public
education directly, if at all. This, and the many other problems are not
insuperable, but the effort required to overcome them was beyond our
immediate resources.
Any reasonable set of benefit weights for education would be expected
to rise with income, thus accentuating the prorich character of education
beyond that in Table 3. However, the weights would have to be very low
at the bottom end to affect any conclusions of the study in a critical way.
To turn education benefits proportional over the income range from
$1,500 to $20,000, the benefit weight in the class $1,000—$ 1,999 would
have to be as low as .14. On the other hand, introducing benefit weights
for consumption goods did reduce the income of the lowest class from
those transfers by almost 50 percent. If the weights at the low end of the
distribution are as low for education as they may be for Medicaid, the
increase in welfare of the poor due to in-kind transfers could be
substantially overstated by Table
Thoughsubject to considerable qualification, we conclude that our
benefit weights undercut the argument that donor benefits rationalize the
existence of in-kind transfers. Since in-kind transfers do not greatly alter
consumption choices, they cannot be justified on donor benefit grounds.
Of course, our results are hardly definitive. Some, for example, may
conclude from Tables 3 and 5thatconsumption choices are importantly
altered. Our failure to calculate benefit weights for education, the largest
in-kind transfer and the one most likely to generate external benefits, is
another limitation of the study.24 Our estimated marginal propensities to
consume were crudely derived, as were our specifications of program
characteristics. Only one utility function was simulated. Other valid
criticisms can also be offered. Nevertheless, we believe our results will
prove robust. Our utility function is fairly flexible and was simulated with
a wide range of elasticities of substitution.
TaxpayerBenefits from In-Kind Transfers:
Estimating Redistribution Services
Inthis section, we turn to the outlay side of our accounts and examine the
effects on the size distribution of personal outlays of distributing the entry
"Personal Consumption of Redistribution." Relying on our tentative
simulation results, we ignore any benefits which may result from the
alteration of recipient consumption patterns. We simply assume that the
36 Smolensky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnickgiving of in-kind transfers is a pure public good generating donor benefits.
Hence, we can use the methodology suggested by Aaron and McGuire
and Malta! to quantify the taxpayer benefits from in-kind transfers. We
intend these calculations to be suggestive rather than definitive.
Maital's Methodology
Assume that for persons with income y,
(14)mu(g)=t(y)A(y)
where:
mu(g)= marginalutility of in-kind transfer g;
1(y)= taxprice per unit of g; and
A (y)= marginalutility of income.
Multiplying (14) by G, the number of units of in-kind transfers, and
rearranging gives
(15)Gt(y)=Gmu(g)JA(y)
Sincethe left-hand side is the total taxes a household with income y
would be willing to pay for the benefits it receives from public goods,
Gt(y) is its imputed benefits, B, from giving. Making the strong assump-
tion that all households have the same, separable utility function, mu(g)
is a constant across all donors since, by definition, they consume the same
quantity of redistribution. Applying (15) to donors i andj and dividing i's
equation by j'sproduces
(16)B/B1=A(y1)/A(y1)
Hence,the imputed benefits of G vary inversely with the marginal utility
of income.
To apply (16) we assume, along with Aaron and McGuire and Malta!,
that A(y) =ay°,where 8 is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect
to income. Hence (16) becomes
(17) B1/BJ= (y1/y1)°
AsMalta! explains, estimates of 0 have been obtained from many
econometric studies of consumption which use CES utility functions.
These studies suggest that for the United States, 01.5.
We can compute the distribution of taxpayer benefits from equation
17, and our lower-bound assumption that the sum of the Bk equals total
cost, and the additional assumption that each household has the mean
cash income of its class. We then have







whereYk= meanincome of class k, Pk =numberof households in class
k, and $68.8 billion =totalspent on our selected set of in-kind transfers
in 1970. The resulting benefits per household are shown in Table 7 (col.
1).
Column 1 indicates that taxpayer benefits are distributed in a steeply
prorich pattern, a result which necessarily follows from our use of
equation 18, with its income elasticity of benefits of 1.5.
To calculate the size distribution of outlays we sum "Consumption of
Redistribution," the recipient value of consumption from in-kind trans-
fersY)(col. 4), personal consumption, personal savings and adjusted
personal taxes. For consumption, savings, and all personal taxes, we
substitute Current Population Survey cash income (col. 3). The required
adjustment to taxes was made quite explicit in Exhibit 4 where aggregate
personal taxes were reduced by the value of "Consumption of Redis-
tribution." That reduction is distributed in column 2, "Offsetting Tax
Reduction," according to the incidence of all personal taxes in 1970
(Reynolds and Smolensky, Appendix C).
For each income class, the difference between personal income per
household (cols.3 +4) and personal outlay per household (cols.
1 + 2 + 3 + 4) is the net sum of columns 1 + 2.25Insetting up our
accounts, we expected that personal outlays would be more unequally
distributed than personal income. That expectation was fulfilled, but the
difference is small. The Gini coefficient for the size distribution of outlays
(col. 5) is .382, which slightly exceeds the coefficient on personal income
(.374). It appears that donor benefits add about as much to inequality as
the offsetting taxes reduce it.
SomeFurther Comparisons
Ourmeasures of income inequality are sensitive to the definition of
income. The distribution of factor earnings plus private transfers as
measured in the Current Population Survey has a Gini coefficient of .444.
Adding governmental cash transfers, which yields the conventional
concept of personal income, lowers the measure to .398. Our further











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































andtaxpayer benefits with the appropriate adjustment to taxes
paid—further lowers the Gini coefficient to .382.
Our accounts lead naturally to a modified concept of disposable
income. To the conventional definition of consumption plus savings we
add in-kind consumption at cash-equivalent value and donor benefits.
The Gini coefficient for this concept of disposable income is .372
compared to a coefficient of .380 for the conventional notion.
Comparing the reduction in inequality which results from altering the
definition of income suggests the following:
1.Adding governmental cash transfers to factor income plus private
transfers lowers inequality by .046. In contrast, adding in-kind
transfers to factor income plus private transfers lowers inequality
by .011.
2.Personal Outlay as we define it has a Gini coefficient of .382, while
as conventionally measured it is .398. This difference results from
two opposing forces. Adding in-kind transfers to cash receipts
reduces inequality by .024 but donor benefits increase inequality
by .008.
3.Subtracting Personal Taxes for our concept of Personal Outlay
reduces inequality by .010.
CONCLUSION
Wehave urged that current practice in accounting for in-kind transfers in
the Personal Income and Outlay Account be altered in the following
ways.
1.All government in-kind transfers accruing to clearly identifiable
beneficiaries should be included. The most important omissions
are the transfers which augment human capital.
2.Transfer income should be valued at the minimum cash transfer
the recipients would accept to forgo the in-kind transfer.
3.The process of making the transfer should be viewed as an activity
with a final output to be accounted for—a collective purchase
which raises personal consumption (with an offsetting reduction
in taxes).
To make more concrete what our proposals would involve, we
illustrated them with a specific set of T accounts. Our proposed account-
ing practices could alter substantially our conceptions of the prevailing
degree of income inequality. To the extent that in-kind transfers are
distributed differently from cash income, the income side could show a
marked change in income inequality. On the outlay side, the definition of
disposable income is significantly altered, which also could shift measured
income inequality.
40 Smolensky, Stiefei, Schmundt, and PlotnickWe then provided an illustrative set of numbers to show how the size
distribution of income was altered when in-kind transfers, treated our
way, were distributed across income classes and added to cash income.
The resulting changes were, in fact, quite small. Redistribution through
in-kind transfer appears to consist of shuffling a great mass of things
about, mainly in the dense middle of the distribution, with those in the
lower tail gaining some.
The emphasis we put on valuing recipient benefits on a cash equivalent
basis for the study of income distribution seems misplaced. Our simula-
tions, while only suggestive, yielded rather high benefit weights. There-
fore, donor benefits generated by the alteration of recipient consumption
patterns cannot be important.
Our results are in no sense definitive, however, and more work could
usefully be done. A low-income-household survey that determined the
number of recipients receiving more than one in-kind transfer and the
mix of benefits that they receive would be especially helpful. If most
low-income families are in several programs, then practical concern over
recipient valuations of in-kind transfers would be ended. (Of course, why
we engage in such transfers when benefit weights are 1 would emerge as
an important issue in public economics.) If only a small proportion of
households receive transfers from more than one source, attention to
consumption of subsidized commodities by low-income families would
yield better income elasticities than were available for this study. Such a
survey might also help to answer a variety of horizontal equity questions
not otherwise tractable. The data collected would also permit rearranging
households into an after-transfer distribution permitting a better under-
standing of the short-run effect of government on the distribution of
income, when income is rather broadly defined.
An issue not yet amenable to household survey solutions is the better
conceptualization, and subsequent calculation, of the set of benefit
weights appropriate for education and other human-capital-augmenting
public programs.
The issues surrounding the concept of donor benefits also need
considerably more attention. It would be especially useful to contrast the
results from assuming Pareto optimal redistribution with other models
such as the median voter framework.
In summary, it seems quite acceptable to continue to account for in-
kind transfers at cost (but including capital costs). The concept of in-kind
transfers in Personal Income and Outlay should be broadened, however,
to include education and manpower training. The notion that redistribu-
tion is an activity augmenting personal income with a concomitant
reduction in taxpayer burdens requires further theoretical and empirical
consideration.
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1.Since there is little reason to believe that taxes are on a marginal benefit basis, all
government expenditures can be thought of as having a transfer component. In
another paper, Reynolds and Smolensky have distributed all government expendi-
tures and taxes by income size class. In that paper, however, in-kind transfers are
treated in the traditional way. It would also have been consistent to enter in-kind taxes
(imprisonment, compulsory school attendance, jury duty, military conscription), but
no attempt was made to do so.
2.Lampman has, however, asked why receipts of insurance benefits, which he considers
to be a transfer, as well as inter-household transfers are not accounted for.
3.In theory, it should be noted, the cash equivalent which recipients put on their in-kind
transfers may exceed, equal, or be less than their cost to government (Schmundt,
Stiefel and Smolensky).
4.Since recipient benefits are expected to be less than taxpayer costs, it may appear
reasonable to value taxpayer benefits as the difference between taxpayer costs and
recipient benefits. The above discussion makes it clear, however, that this method is
inappropriate.
5.Schmundt, Smolensky, and Stiefel have shown that correctly measuring recipient
benefits from in-kind programs requires simultaneously evaluating all in-kind
benefits received by the recipient. For expository purposes only, the in-kind programs
are treated separately.
6.We assume that there is no "stigma" or other effects associated with cash transfers
which would cause the recipient to value the transfer at less than the dollar amount.
7. A more complete specification would treat the government's costs in effecting that
transfer as "value added by government." That cost appears in both the current and
modified accounts in "Government Purchases."
8.If we had started de nova, the two offsetting tax entries would not have appeared.
9.In recent years, the cost to the government of the food stamp program can be found
primarily in line 27, other health, labor and welfare, and the column federal transfer
payments and "net interest paid," of Table 3.10, "Government Expenditures by
Type of Function," in the July issue of the Surveyof Current Business andhence in
the various other displays related to government.
10.Indeed, the Public Housing Authorities run a surplus on current account.
11.A. Skolnik and S. Dales, Table 1, Social Security Bulletin, December 1972.
12.The seven programs are food stamps, public housing, Medicare, Medicaid,
elementary—secondary-other public education, higher public education, and man-
power programs.
13.Of all the possible functional forms for a utility function, this is one of the few that is
empirically tractable and yields demand functions consistent with economic theory
(Goldberger). Recent work on consumer benefits from public housing lends empirical
support to our choice (Murray).
14.In equation 1, omitting the exponent olo-—1simplifies calculations and does not
affect the final results.
15.This procedure assumes identical utility functions for all families of a given size and
income but allows them to vary across income classes and by family size.
16.An example of an in-kind transfer in this category is the school lunch program, in
which a student can get a 60 cent lunch for 30 cents, but not a 40 cent lunch 20
cents nor two 60 cent lunches, but who may bring a sandwich. Of the five programs in
this simulation, food stamps can fall into this, category, though they may not if the
family does not exceed its food stamp allotment when buying food. Similarly, rent
subsidies may or may not be in this category, depending on family consumption
choices.
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ISmolensky, Stiefel, Schmundt, and Plotnick17.For example, federal regulations indicate that a two-person family with cash income of
$2,869 in 1970 was eligible for $725 of food stamps at acostot $583, a subsidy rate of
.20. Because the family must buy all the stamps if it is to receive any, xr =$725.
18.An inconsistent case exists if assigning good Ito one category yields, from (6) through
(8), an xp1 that contradicts the assignment. For instance, a permutation placing rent
supplements in category II (where xp> xr) might result in xp < xr; this case would be
excluded.
19.These income figures correspond to the income classes in the Summary of Consumer
Expenditures, 1960—61, which are the original data, but are inflated to 1970 price
levels.
20.The benefit weights on public housing are more variable than our table suggests and
fall as low as .24 in one instance. Packages of transfers which contain public housing
also, therefore, have quite variable, and frequently quite low, benefit weights. To a
lesser extent, there is some greater variability in the weights than revealed by Table 4
for other housing programs as well.
21.Specifically, we assumed=.5,and (1) public-housing tenants receive no other
benefits, (2) Medicare enrollees receive no other benefits, and (3) all food stamp
recipients are on Medicaid and vice versa. These conditions, of course, do not reflect
the true pattern of program overlap in 1970. Also a greater change in Table 3's
figures could be produced by assuming, e.g., that some Medicaid recipients receive
no food stamps. Our choices, however, yield the largest change of any simple set of
assumptions.
Since the simulations cover a limited income range, rough extrapolations were used
to obtain a full set of benefit weights. Table 5 was constructed with the following
weights:
Income Class Public Housing Medicare
Food Stamps
and Medicaid
50—999 0.3 0.6 0.5
1—1,999 0.5 0.7 0.6
2—2,999 0.6 0.8 0.7
3—3,999 0.7 0.85 0.85
4-4,999 0.85 0.9 0.85
5-5,999 0.95 0.95 0.95
6,000+ 1.00 1.00 1.00
22.One interpretation of Table 6, obviously, is that in-kind transfers in 1970 may have
wasted as much as $2 billion.
23.However, the Gini coefficient is not substantially altered when the Medicaid weights
are applied to all human-investment programs.
24.See footnote 23, however.
25.This section assumed a CES utility function that is constant for all people; earlier we
explicitly allowed the function to vary across income classes and by family size. Hence
combining these results in Table 7 is not strictly justifiable.
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My discussion falls into three parts: (1) a brief summary of the argumentation
and conclusions of Smolensky, Schmundt, Plotnick, and Stiefel; (2) an explica-
tion of their major points; and (3) a critical evaluation of their contribution.
Our authors contend that the National Income Accounts should be adapted to
reflect the impact of in-kind transfers on both recipients' and taxpayer-donors'
income. Specifically they propose that the Personal Income and Outlay Account
be altered to include in-kind transfers valued at their minimum cash value to
recipients and that taxpayer benefits from redistribution be added to the outlay
side of the account. Assuming "Pareto Efficient Redistribution," our authors
would enter as an outlay "Consumption of that is, the taxpayer
benefit from redistribution, with an offsetting reduction in the entry for personal
taxes. The estimated minimum cash value to the recipients of a selected number
of in-kind transfers is based on a simulation exercise involving utility maximiza-
tion. The benefit weights derived for the in-kind transfers from this exercise are
all close to unity. Our authors find that the size distribution of income is altered
only slightly if in-kind transfers, evaluated in this manner, are distributed across
income classes. They conclude with several qualifications of their procedures
and suggestions for extending their work.
H
Our authors wish to put "welfare before wealth and the size distribution [of
incomel before the functional distribution" as the purpose of the national
accounts. To this end they (1) propose changes in the Personal Income and
Outlay Account to reflect both the benefits recipients receive from in-kind
transfers and the benefits received by taxpayers from redistribution programs;
and (2) provide some illustrative numbers indicating the general order of
magnitude these changes make in the estimated size distribution of income.
Our authors illustrate their proposed changes in the national accounts in terms
of a cash transfer program as well as medical care and public housing in-kind
transfer programs. Assume that earned income is 100, that there is no saving,
and that there are two government outlays, 1 Ofor a pure public good and 30 for a
program providing medical services at no charge, as shown in Exhibit 4. Under
current procedures, personal consumption expenditures would be entered as
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shown in Exhibit 4. The authors would explicitly recognize the consumption of
the medical service by the recipients by adding the minimum cash value of this
service to personal outlay Taxpayer benefits from the program would be
recorded as "Consumption of Redistribution" and evaluated at the cost of the
program, in this instance, 30. Offsetting this addition would be a reduction of
personal taxes of 30, with a similar increase in disposable income. Thus personal
taxes would be 10, the amount needed to finance the public good. On the
income side, the minimum cash value of the medical service to the recipients
is added to earned income.
The authors' proposal for the treatment of in-kind transfers from a program
such as public housing, which is not directlyfinanced by tax outlays, involves not
only the procedures just discussed but also the introduction of government
capital consumption into the accounts, as proposed, for example, by Nancy and
Richard Ruggles, and illustrated in Exhibits 4-A, 6-B, 6-C, and 6-D.
Our authors illustrate their accounting proposals with seven programs (food
stamps, public housing, Medicare, Medicaid, public elementary and secondary
education, public higher education, and manpower) for which total expenditures
by all levels of government in 1970 were $68.8 billion. (Total cash transfers were
$63 billion in that year.) The authors believe that these seven programs are
vehicles for in-kind transfers, since they provide goods and services "to clearly
identifiable beneficiaries at other than marginal cost." Although these in-
kind transfers, evaluated at taxpayer cost, accrue in a prorich manner, as seen
in Table 3, column 10, they are indeed more evenly distributed than cash income.
Hence, including them in personal income decreases the Gini coefficient from
.398 to .371, as shown graphically in Figure 1.
The authors attempt to determine whether the distribution of in-kind transfers
evaluated at their cash value to recipients, rather than at taxpayer cost, would
become even more prorich. A range of benefit weights is calculated to convert
taxpayers' costs of five programs (food stamps, public housing, rent supple-
ments, Medicare, and Medicaid) to benefits evaluated at their cash equivalency
to recipients. Each recipient family is assumed to participate in a package of
in-kind transfer programs. A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility
function, a budget constraint (Y) and maximizing behavior are assumed and the
utility that the family receives is calculated. Then that cash income (EY) which
will allow the family to reach this same level of utility in the absence of any in-kind
transfers is computed. The difference between EYand Yls then defined as the
increased welfare in dollar terms generated by the in-kind programs. The ratio of
this difference (EY less Y) to the taxpayer cost of the transfer programs is the
benefit weight.
Commodities in a transfer program can fallin one of three categories,
depending upon the manner in which the rules governing the program affect a
household's budget constraint. In category I, there is no relevant constraint
imposed on the quantity of the commodity that the household can consume. In
category II, a certain amount of the commodity must be consumed but additional
units can be purchased at the market price.In category Ill,the quantity
consumed and the price of the commodity are both fixed. Medicare and
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fall in categories II or Ill; public housing is in category Ill; and rent supplements
can be in any one of the categories.
Benefit weights are computed for five prototype families and several in-kind
program combinations. The benefit weights shown in Table 4 range from 0.61
for public housing to 1 .0 for food stamps. The weights for two- or three-program
packages are generally higher than the weights for programs taken separately.
Since benefit weights generally rise with income, if in-kind transfers adjusted
to their cash-equivalent basis are substituted in personal income distribution for
in-kind transfers at taxpayer cost, the Gini coefficient rises but only slightly. Thus
with in-kind transfers evaluated at taxpayer cost the Gini coefficient is .371; on a
cash-equivalent basis it is .374. For the food stamp, public housing, Medicare,
and Medicaid programs taken together, the cash equivalent is estimated to be
83 percent of taxpayer cost. Even though our authors judge that on a conceptual
basis, benefits from public elementary, secondary, and higher education should
be treated as in-kind transfers financed by consumption outlays for redistribu-
tion, they do not attempt to estimate weights for these programs.
Finally, the authors distribute the outlay. "Personal Consumption of Redis-
tribution,"in a manner first discussed by Aaron and McGuire. Following Maital,
our authors assume that the taxpayer benefits from redistribution vary inversely
with the marginal utility of income, with 1 .5 the value of the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to income. On this basis, taxpayer benefits from redistribu-
tion are distributed in a steeply prorich pattern with the income elasticity of
benefits necessarily being 1 .5, as shown in Table 7, column 1.
Consonant with their proposal that the accounts should reflect benefits that
taxpayers derive from redistribution, aggregate tax payments must be reduced
by $68.8 billion, the total expenditures for those programs assumed to generate
in-kind transfers in 1970. If this offsetting tax reduction is distributed according
to the estimated incidence of all personal taxes in 1970, it lust happens that the
tax reduction in each income class very closely approximates the taxpayer
benefits from redistribution allocated to the income class according to the Maital
procedure (see Table 7, columns 1 and 2).
III
I am quite sympathetic with the authors' effort to introduce welfare and utility
concepts into the quantitative analysis of fiscal outcomes. The theoretical public
sector analysis of Sam uelson, Musgrave, Buchanan, and others has long clearly
pointed in this direction but only very recently have public sector quantitative
studies begun to reflect this analysis.I think a significant contribution of our
authors is the fact that they have grappled imaginatively with the question of
income distribution and the public sector in a manner that reflects a consciously
articulated behavioral base. This real accomplishment is not diminished by the
fact that I feel a number of deficiencies exist in both their proposed conceptual
framework and in their interpretation of some of the quantitative results.
Specifically, my critique focuses on these three areas of the paper: (1) their
proposed modificationof thenational accounting framework;(2)their
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evaluation of "Personal Consumption from Redistribution,' the taxpayer-donor
benefits from redistribution programs.
The authors propose a new entry in the national accounts,'Personal
Consumption of Redistribution," to be measured by the total cost of programs
that provide goods and services 'to clearly identifiable beneficiaries at other than
marginal cost." Such programs are, by definition, transfer programs.I am
uncomfortable with this definition of a transfer program. Take the case of public
education. The beneficiaries of public education are not all clearly identifiable.
Students and their families are indeed known but educational policy for decades
has been built on the assumption that there are notable external benefits from
elementary and secondary education. The identification and quantification of
these external benefits as well as the identification of their recipients are still
largelymattersofconjecture.Nonetheless,to the extent that these
beneficiaries do exist, they enjoy benefits at less than marginal cost and so, by
our authors' definition, they are transferees. However, if such an extension of
the concept of transferee is accepted, then it would seem that nearly all public
services have to be defined as transfer programs. For example, the beneficiaries
of national defense services, police and fire protection, the system of justice,
and general government all enjoy benefits at other than marginal cost.
Further, even within the population that clearly and directly benefits from
education, an additional distinction is crucial. The educational service provided to
a child of an affluent family does not seem, for analytical purposes, to be an
analogue either of the medical service provided to an indigent family under
Medicare or of the education provided to a child of an indigent family. It can be
argued that the intent of social policy is to provide medical and educational
services at less than marginal cost to indigent households. However, presuma-
bly, children in affluent families are given free access to public education in the
belief that by so doing some goal, say, socialization, is promoted—a goal quite
distinct from redistribution.I think realism is excessively sacrificed if services
such as education of the wealthy are denominated in-kind transfers along with
public housing and food stamps.
A preferable procedure might be to designate first which programs can by
general consensus be denominated redistributional in intent, as for example,
Medicaid. Programs which seem to have some redistributional intent, such as
public elementary and secondary education, can then be identified. Following
this classification exercise, in-kind transfers can be estimated for either all or
some fraction of the program's outlay, depending on its designation. Such a
procedure is admittedly arbitrary, butIthink it may be preferable to forcing
programs into a redistributional mold that ill fits them.
Double-entry accounting requires a dollar-for-dollar reduction in personal
taxes for each "Personal Consumption of Redistribution" entry. A reduction in
taxes presumably implies an increase in households' discretionary power over
income. Such an implication is plausible as long as we assume that all transfers
are Pareto-efficient. However, Isee no logical basis for restricting such
reasoning to the transfer portion of government outlays. Must we not just as
reasonably assume that all government outlays are Pareto-efficient? This
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Public Services,which, inturn, would be offset dollar-for-dollar against
personal taxes, As a consequence, all personal taxes would be eliminated from
the Personal Income and Outlay Account. Public consumption would then be
treated in the accounts on a par with market consumption, with the clear
implication that coercion is not present in the payment of taxes. Although there
is normative and undoubtedly considerable operational content to the benefit
principle of taxation I think the judgment that all tax payments are discretionary
expenditures is not fully justified.
These concerns with our authors' proposals for modifying the national
accounts are mitigated, at least in my mind, if the proposals are not taken to
require the complete elimination of current procedures. Though Occam's razor
is a generally valid, even if little-used tool,I think that in this instance entities
might well be multiplied. A useful measure of the distribution of welfare might
well be obtained if series based on proposals similar to thOse of our authors
were generated to supplement the current series. The complete elimination of
time series data for disposable income, however, seems a high price to pay
even for introducing welfare theory into the national accounts.
Our authors conclude that valuing recipient benefits on a cash-equivalent
basis actually altered the size distribution of income only slightly, because they
found that benefit weights are typically near unity. They infer from this result that
donor benefits generated by the alteration of recipient consumption patterns
must be unimportant. The authors' finding is undoubtedly valuable for policy
considerations, but I am not comfortable with their dismissal of the importance
to bureaucrats, if not to donors, of in-kind transfers. I suspect that the apparent
long-standing preference for in-kind transfers over cash transfers must satisfy a
donor wish that some attempt be made to control the spending patterns of the
program recipients, or the dominance of in-kind over cash transfers may testify
to the lobbying strength of such groups as the construction industry, the Farm
Bureau, and the National Association of Social Workers.
Finally, there is the question of the proposed new entry, "Personal Consump-
tion of Redistribution." Although one may feel a bitillat ease with the
preciseness of the figures displayed in Table 7,I think that their impact on the
size distribution of welfare across income classes is entirely proper. Previous
government benefit-incidence studies have typically ignoredallexternal
benefits whether redistributional or not and consequently have so allocated
benefits that the fisc, specifically state and local fiscs, appear to redistribute
welfare massively in favor of lower-income classes. Such results have
been accepted as conventional wisdom even though it is difficult to interpret
precisely what is meant by "benefits" in such a context. Certainly these benefits
cannot be understood within the framework of benefit taxation. The massive
benefits received by the lower-income classes in these studies, for example,
cannot form the basis for assessing benefit taxes. Our authors' estimates for the
personal consumption of redistribution, on the other hand, do establish a title for
assessing benefit taxes.
One final observation concerning "Personal Consumption of Redistribution."
What of the anomalous situation that can arise if the benefits represented by the
In-Kind Transfers to the Personal Income and Outlay Account I49"Personal Consumption of Redistribution" can be increased merely by increas-
ing the number of poor with a simultaneous increase in the dollar outlay for
redistribution. As measured by "Consumption of Redistribution" it might well
be that welfare in society increases pan passu with the number of in a
society. This anomaly is dispelled, however, ifitis recognized that benefit
evaluation is made in a particular context with such variables as total output,
income distribution, and the number of poor, all given. If these values change
then the welfare measure of benefits must also be adjusted. This means, of
course, that a time series of "Consumption of Redistribution" cannot be used
unequivocally as an index of welfare across periods.
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